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Abstract
Is it possible to patch software bugs in P4 programs without
human involvement? We show that this is partially possible
in many cases due to advances in software testing and the
structure of P4 programs. Our insight is that runtime veri-
fication can detect bugs, even those that are not detected at
compile-time, with machine learning-guided fuzzing. This
enables a more automated and real-time localization of bugs
in P4 programs using software testing techniques like Taran-
tula. Once the bug in a P4 program is localized, the faulty
code can be patched due to the programmable nature of P4.
In addition, platform-dependent bugs can be detected. From
P414 to P416 (latest version), our observation is that as the pro-
grammable blocks increase, the patchability of P4 programs
increases accordingly. To this end, we design, develop, and
evaluate P6 that (a) detects, (b) localizes, and (c) patches bugs
in P4 programs with minimal human interaction. P6 tests P4
switch non-intrusively, i.e., requires no modification to the P4
program for detecting and localizing bugs. We used a P6 pro-
totype to detect and patch seven existing bugs in eight publicly
available P4 application programs deployed on two different
switch platforms: behavioral model (bmv2) and Tofino. Our
evaluation shows that P6 significantly outperforms bug de-
tection baselines while generating fewer packets and patches
bugs in P4 programs such as switch.p4 without triggering
any regressions.
1 Introduction
Programmable networks herald a paradigm shift in the de-
sign and operation of networks. The network devices on the
data plane, e.g., switches, that traditionally have fixed and
vendor-specific network functionality and rely on proprietary
hardware and software, can now be programmed and cus-
tomized by network operators. The P4 language [1, 2] was
introduced to enable the programmability and customization
of data plane functionalities in network devices. P4 is an
open-source domain-specific language designed to allow pro-
gramming of packet forwarding planes, and is now supported
by a number of network vendors.
While programmable networks enable to break the tie be-
tween vendor-specific hardware and proprietary software, they
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facilitate an independent evolution of software and hardware.
With the P4 language, one can define in a P4 program, the
instructions for processing the packets, e.g., how the received
packet should be read, manipulated, and forwarded by a net-
work device, e.g., a switch. Nevertheless, with the new ca-
pabilities, new challenges in P4 software verification, i.e.,
ensuring that the software fully satisfies all the expected re-
quirements, have been unleashed. The P4 switch behavior
depends on the correctness of the P4 programs running on
them. We realize that a bug in a P4 program, i.e., a small
fault such as a missing line of code or a fat finger error, or a
vendor-specific implementation error, can trigger unexpected
and abnormal switch behavior. In the worst case, it can result
in a network outage, or even a security compromise [3].
Problem Statement. In this paper, we pose the follow-
ing question: “Is it possible to detect, localize, and
patch software bugs in a P4 program without human in-
volvement?”. We believe that being able to answer this ques-
tion, even partially, unlocks the full potential of programmable
networks, improves their security, as well as increases their
penetration in operational and mission-critical networks.
Recently, a panoply of P4 program verification tools [4–9]
has been proposed. These verification systems, however, fail
to repair the P4 program containing bugs. Most of them [4–7]
aim to statically verify user-defined P4 programs which are
later, compiled to run on a target switch. They mostly find
bugs that violate the memory safety properties, e.g., invalid
memory access, buffer overflow, etc. Furthermore, they are
prone to false positives and are unable to verify the run-
time behavior on real packets. In addition, classes of bugs,
e.g., checksum-related, ECMP (Equal-Cost Multi-path) hash
calculations-related or platform-dependent bugs, cannot be
detected by static analysis approaches. Since, runtime verifi-
cation aims to verify the actual behavior against the expected
behavior of a switch by passing specially-crafted input pack-
ets to the switch and observing the behavior, such verification
is complementary to static analysis. Note, the detection of
bugs causing the abnormal runtime behavior is a complex
and challenging task. In particular, the P4 switch does not
throw any runtime exceptions. Furthermore, the detection of
bugs can be a nightmare if there is no output, i.e., packets
are silently dropped instead of being forwarded. Thus, the
runtime verification of the switch behavior is crucial.
A useful approach to verify the runtime behavior is fuzz
testing or fuzzing [10–20], a well-known dynamic program
1
ar
X
iv
:2
00
4.
10
88
7v
2 
 [c
s.S
E]
  2
6 A
pr
 20
20
testing technique that generates semi-valid, random inputs
which may trigger abnormal program behavior. However, for
fuzzing to be efficient, intelligence needs to be added to the
input generation, so that the inputs are not rejected by the
parser and it maximizes the chances of triggering bugs. This
becomes crucial especially in networking, where the input
space is huge, e.g., a 32-bit destination IPv4 address field in
a packet header has 232 possibilities. With the 5-tuple flows,
the input space gets even more complex and large. To make
fuzzing more effective, we consider the use of machine learn-
ing, to guide the fuzzing process to generate smart inputs that
trigger abnormal target behavior. Recently, Shukla et al. [20]
have shown that Reinforcement Learning (RL) [21, 22] can
be used to train a verification system. We build upon [20]
by adding (a) static analysis to the fuzzing process to signifi-
cantly reduce the input search space, and thus, adding input
structure awareness, and (b) support for platform-dependent
bug detection.
Even if a bug in a P4 program is detected, the localization of
code statements in the P4 code that are responsible for the bug,
is non-trivial. The difficulty stems from the fact that practical
P4 programs can be large with a dense conditional structure.
In addition, the same faulty statements in a P4 program may
be executed for both passed as well as failed test cases and
thus, it gets hard to pinpoint the actual faulty line/s of code.
Tarantula [23–25] is a dynamic program analysis technique
that helps in fault localization by pinpointing the potential
faulty lines of code. To localize the software bugs, we tailor
Tarantula for generic software to P4 programs by building a
localizer called P4Tarantula and integrating it with the bug
detection of machine learning-guided fuzzing. In this paper,
we combine these two approaches to detect and localize bugs
in P4 programs in real-time.
P6. We, however, realize that automated program repair [26]
is an uncharted territory and becomes increasingly important
as the software development lifecycle in programmable net-
works is short [27] with insufficient testing. In this paper, we
show that due to the structure of P4 programs, it is possible
to automate the patching of platform-independent bugs in P4
programs, if the patch is available. To this end, we present
P6, P4 with runtime Program Patching, a novel runtime P4-
switch verification system that (a) detects, (b) localizes,
and (c) patches software bugs in a P4 program with mini-
mal human effort. P6 improves the existing work based on
machine learning-guided fuzzing [20] in P4 by extending it
and augmenting it with: (a) automated localization, and (b)
runtime patching. P6 relies on the combination of static anal-
ysis of the P4 program and Reinforcement Learning (RL)
technique to guide the fuzzing process to verify the P4-switch
behavior at runtime.
P6 in a nutshell. In P6, the first step is to capture the ex-
pected behavior of a P4 switch, which is accomplished using
information from three different sources: (i) the control plane
configuration, (ii) queries in p4q (§3.2.1), a query language
which we leverage to describe expected behavior using condi-
tional statements, and (iii) accepted header layouts, e.g., IPv4,
IPv6, etc, learned via static analysis of the P4 program. If
the actual runtime behavior to the test packets generated via
machine-learning guided fuzzing differs from the expected
behavior through the violation of the p4q queries, it signals
a bug to P6 which then identifies a patch from a library of
patches. If the patch is available, P6 modifies the original
P4 program to no longer trigger the bug signaled by the p4q
queries. Then, the patched P4 program is subjected to sanity
and regression testing.
We develop a prototype of P6 and evaluate it by testing it
on eight P416 application programs from switch.p4 [28], P4
tutorial solutions [29], and NetPaxos codebase [30] across
two P4 switch platforms, namely, behavioral model ver-
sion 2 (bmv2) [31] and Tofino [32]. Our results show that
P6 successfully detects, localizes and patches diverse bugs
in all P416 programs while significantly outperforming bug
detection baselines without introducing any regressions.
Contributions. Our main contributions are:
•We design, implement, and evaluate P6, the first end-to-end
runtime P4 verification system that detects, localizes, and
patches bugs in P4 programs non-intrusively. (§3)
•We observe that the success of P6 relies on the increased
patchability of P4 program from old (P414) to the new version
(P416). We confirm this by studying the code of P4 applica-
tions in two different P4 versions (P414, P416). (§2)
• We present a P6 prototype and report on an evaluation
study. We evaluate our P6 prototype on a P4 switch running
eight P416 programs (including switch.p4 with 8715 LOC)
from publicly available sources [28–30] across two platforms,
namely, behavioral model and Tofino. Our results show that P6
non-intrusively detects both platform-dependent and platform-
independent bugs, and significantly outperforms state-of-the-
art bug detection baselines. (§5)
•We show that in case of platform-independent bugs, P6 can
localize bugs and fix the P4 program, when the patch is avail-
able, without causing any regressions or introducing new bugs
in an automated fashion. (§3, §5)
• To ensure reproducibility and facilitate follow-up work, we
will release the P6 software and library of ready patches for all
existing bugs in the P4 programs to the research community.
2 Challenges & Opportunities in P4 Verifica-
tion
In this section, we describe the P4 packet processing pipeline.
Then, we outline the challenges in discovering bugs in P4
programs or switches, and we motivate the need for runtime
verification. We conclude this section by characterizing the
evolution and structure of P4 programs, that, to our surprise
provides opportunities for automated P4 program patching.
2
Ingress 
Match-Action
Packet 
Replication 
Engine 
(PRE) Packet
Egress 
Parser
Egress Match-Action
Parser MyParser(...){
(…)
state parse_ipv4 {
pkt.extract(hdr.ipv4);
transition accept;
}
(...)
}
(...)
update_checksum(
 (...)
{ hdr.ipv4.version,
   …
hdr.ipv4.dstAddr },
  (…); )
(...)
Egress 
Deparser
Ingress 
Deparser
Buffer 
Queuing 
Engine 
(BQE)
Ingress Parser
Figure 1: An example of a platform-independent bug in P416 packet processing pipeline.
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2.1 Packet Processing Pipeline of P4
P4 [1, 2] is a domain-specific language comprising of
packet-processing abstractions, e.g., headers, parsers, tables,
actions, and controls. The P4 packet processing pipeline
evolved from [33] to its current form P416 [2], see Figure 1. In
P416 packet processing pipeline, there are six programmable
blocks that are platform-independent, namely, ingress
parser, ingress match-action, ingress deparser,
egress parser, egress match-action, and egress
deparser. The programmable blocks are annotated with a
solid line in Figures 1 and 2.
The ingress parser transforms the packet from bits into
headers according to a parser specification provided by the
programmer. After parsing, an ingress match-action (also
called ingress control function) decides how the packet will be
processed. Then, the packet is queued for egress processing in
the ingress deparser. Upon dequeuing, the packet is processed
by an egress match-action (also called egress control function).
The egress deparser specification dictates how packets are
deparsed from separate headers into a bit representation on
output, and finally, the packet leaves the switch. Note that both
ingress and egress match-actions (control functions) direct
the packet through any number of match-action tables.
In the P416 packet processing pipeline, there are also two
platform-dependent blocks (annotated with dashed lines in
Figures 1 and 2), that rely on proprietary implementations
of the hardware vendors and are non-programmable. These
blocks are the packet replication engine (PRE) and the
buffer queuing engine (BQE).
2.2 Challenges: Runtime Bugs in P4
Bugs or errors can occur at any stage in the P4 pipeline. If
a bug occurs in any of the programmable blocks, then the
bug is platform-independent and software patching can solve
the problem. If the bug appears in the non-programmable or
platform-dependent blocks, namely, the PRE or BQE, then the
vendor has to be informed to fix the issue as the implementa-
tion is vendor-specific. P4 program verification systems [4–7]
are able to detect bugs using static analysis. Unfortunately,
static analysis is (i) prone to false positives, (ii) cannot detect
platform-dependent bugs, and (iii) cannot detect runtime bugs
that require to actively send real packets.
As an example, consider the scenario in Figure 1 (solid line
blocks) that illustrates part of the implementation of Layer-3
(L3) switch, provided in the P4 tutorial solutions [29]. Here,
the parser does not check if the IPv4 header contains IPv4 op-
tions or not, i.e., if the IPv4 ihl field is equal to 5 or not. When
updating the IPv4 checksum of the packets during egress pro-
cessing, IPv4 options are not taken into account, hence for
those IPv4 packets with options, the resulting checksum is
wrong causing such packets to be forwarded and incorrectly
dropped at the next hop. This leads to anomalies in network
behavior. Other bugs that fall in this category are those re-
lated to IPv4/6 checksum in the packet (see Figure 5 later).
Such bugs are platform-independent, as they only result from
programming errors.
Figure 4 illustrates a simple scenario where due to a bug
or fault, the packet reaching a P4 switch has a time-to-live
(TTL) field in the IP header with value as 0. The expected
behavior is that the packet gets dropped, but currently, there
is no such check in the P4 code. Thus, the switch forwards
the packet and decreases the value of the TTL field, causing
it to be increased to 255 incorrectly. This happens due to
wraparound caused by underflow in an 8-bit field. Such an
anomaly can be non-trivial to detect and localize. In addition,
it can be responsible for the abnormal behavior of a P4 switch.
As illustrated in Figure 5, the problem lies in the fact that
the P4 program fails to specify that the IPv4 checksum in-
side the packet needs to be verified before forwarding. An
adversary can easily intercept the packets and modify them
(e.g., as a Man-in-the-Middle attack (MitM)) and does not
even need to recalculate the checksum. Therefore, additional
information can be inserted even into encrypted packets.
When such a malicious or malformed packet arrives at the P4
switch, it selects the corresponding action based on the match-
action tables and forwards the packet without verifying the
checksum. Such checksum-related bugs may inflict serious
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Figure 3: Evolution of the P4 program structure from P414 to P416 version.
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Figure 4: P4 switch running the P4 program does not check if the
time-to-live (TTL) value in the packet is 0. Blue arrows show the
expected, red dashed arrows show the actual path.
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Figure 5: P4 switch running the P4 program does not check the faulty
IPv4 checksum in the packet. Blue arrows show the expected path,
red dashed arrows show the actual path.
damages to critical servers and can be a nightmare to debug.
For a platform-dependent bug, consider the scenario shown
in Figure 2 (dashed line blocks). Here, we assume a P4 pro-
gram implements at least two match-action tables. Any table
except the last one could be a longest prefix match (LPM) table,
offering unicast, clone and drop actions (ingress match-action
block). The last match-action table implements an access
control list (ACL). So, the packets can either be dropped or
forwarded according to the chosen actions by the previous
tables. In this case, it is possible that conflicting forwarding
decisions are made. Consider packets are matched by the first
table (Table 1) and a clone decision is made, later, those are
dropped by the ACL table (Table n). In such a case, the for-
warding behavior depends on the implementation of the PRE,
which is platform-dependent. The implementation of PRE of
the SimpleSwitch target in the behavioral model (bmv2) is
illustrated in Figure 2. It would drop the original packet, how-
ever, forward the cloned copy of the packet. Similar bugs
can occur, if instead of the clone action, the resubmit action
is chosen (blue). Similarly, another bug can be found when
implementing multicast (green).
The above motivates us to turn our attention to runtime
detection of bugs. Runtime verification is a useful and com-
plementary tool in the P4 verification repertoire that detects
both platform-independent bugs resulting from programming
errors as well as platform-dependent bugs.
2.3 Opportunities for Patching:
The Structure of a P4 Program
In the evolution of P4, there are two recent versions: P414 [36]
and P416 [2]. P416 allows programmers to use definitions of
a target switch-specific architecture, PSA (Portable Switch
Architecture) [34,35]. P416 is an upgraded version of P414. In
particular, a large number of language features have been elim-
inated from P414 and moved into libraries including counters,
checksum units, meters, etc., in P416. P414 allowed the pro-
grammer to explicitly program three blocks: ingress parser (in-
cluding header definitions of accepted header layouts), ingress
control and egress control functions. Recall that P416 allows
to explicitly program six programmable blocks (see Figure 1).
By analyzing programs in the P414 and P416 versions,
we realize that as more blocks of the P4 program get pro-
grammable, there is more onus on the programmer to write a
program that behaves as expected (when it gets compiled and
deployed on the P4 switch). Missing checks or fat finger errors
can cause havoc in the network. However, this is a blessing
in disguise as the more programmable the code is, the more
patchable it is. Thus, programming errors can be fixed. Fig-
ures 3a and 3b illustrate that the potentially patchable code
percentage increases from P414 to P416 in all applications
(excluding calculator) from P4 tutorial solutions [29] and
NetPaxos codebase [30] in behavioral model (bmv2) switch
platform [31] and other generic PSA switch platforms [34,35],
e.g., Tofino [32] respectively. Figures 3c and 3d illustrate the
patchable code percentage in the latest P416 version. The
patchable code percentage comes from the six programmable
blocks in P416. Roughly, whatever is programmable, is patch-
able. In principle, around 40-45% of a P4 program is patch-
able in P416 programs for behavioral model (bmv2) switch
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Figure 6: P6 in Action: depicting the automated detection, localization and patching of a bug in a L3 switch P4 program [29].
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Figure 7: P6 Workflow. Modules of P6 (in solid green boxes).
platform [31] (Figure 3c). This increases to 50-55% if the
ingress deparser and egress parser are programmable for other
target switch platforms, e.g., Tofino [32] (Figure 3d). More
importantly, the parser and header definitions account for 20-
40% of the total patchable code.
Observation 1: From P414 to P416, the P4 program possesses
twice as many programmable blocks doubling the opportuni-
ties for patching.
If there is no bug in the parser/header code, the incoming
packets with invalid header values will be dropped as expected
and the packets with valid header values will be transmitted
to the upcoming blocks else the invalid or semi-valid packets
will incorrectly pass through the parser and may trigger ab-
normal runtime behavior. Assuming there was no bug in the
parser/header code, those valid packets that are transmitted to
the next blocks may still exhibit abnormal runtime behavior,
if the programmable blocks containing, e.g., the application
code logic, deparser have bug/s or due to bug/s in the platform
dependent part which is vendor implementation-specific.
Observation 2: Once, a bug is detected and localized in the
platform-independent part of a P4 program, it is patchable; a
platform-dependent bug is not patchable, however, the vendor
can be informed if and when detected.
3 P6: System Design
3.1 P6: Overview
The goal of P6 (see Figure 7) is to detect, localize and patch
the software bugs in a P4 program at runtime with minimal
human effort. This is achieved by verifying the actual runtime
behavior against the expected behavior of a P4 switch running
a pre-compiled P4 program to the incoming packets.
The P6 system contains three main modules:
(1) Fuzzer: Generates test packets using RL-guided fuzzing,
static analysis, and p4q queries (§3.2.1) to the P4 switch
running the pre-compiled P4 program. (§3.2)
(2) Localizer: P4Tarantula is the Localizer which pinpoints
faulty lines of code causing bugs in the P4 program. (§3.3)
(3) Patcher: Automates patching of the bugs localized by
P4Tarantula Localizer, if patchable. Then, Patcher compiles
and loads the patched P4 program on the P4 switch. (§3.4)
P6 Workflow. P6 is a closed-loop control system. Through a
pre-generated dictionary from control plane configuration,
p4q queries, and static analysis of a P4 program, the ex-
pected runtime behavior of the P4 switch is captured and
sent as an input to the Fuzzer containing the RL Agent and
the Reward System (§3.2). As shown in Figure 7, the Fuzzer
selects appropriate mutation actions such as add/delete/mod-
ify bytes in a packet to generate test packets towards the
P4 switch running the pre-compiled P4 program 1 . If the
actual runtime behavior towards the packets defies the ex-
pected behavior through the violation of the p4q queries, it
signals a bug in the form of a reward as a feedback to the
Reward System which is then, exploited by the RL Agent to
improve the training process by selecting better mutation ac-
tions on the packet 2 . After the bug detection, the Fuzzer
automatically triggers Localizer (§3.3), P4Tarantula (only for
platform-independent bugs; for platform-dependent bugs, the
vendor is informed) which pinpoints the faulty line of code
3 to trigger the Patcher (§3.4) which searches for the appro-
priate patch from a library of patches for the corresponding
5
P4 program 4 . If the patch is available, Patcher modifies the
original P4 program, compiles and loads it on the P4 switch
and checks if the bug is no longer triggered by p4q queries by
repeating the whole-cycle and executing sanity and regression
testing 5 . Note, P6 is non-intrusive and thus, requires no
modification to the P4 program for testing before patching.
P6 in Action. Before we dive into the details of Fuzzer, Local-
izer and Patcher, we demonstrate the operation of P6. Figure
6 illustrates how P6 detects, localizes, and patches an exist-
ing bug in a layer-3 (L3) switch P4 source code (program)
from [29] in an automated fashion. The left part of Figure
6 shows the P4 program containing a platform-independent
bug in the parser code, i.e., no header field validation is im-
plemented, hence all IPv4 packets are incorrectly accepted
by the parser. After the P4 program is deployed on the P4
switch, P6 is triggered. Initially, the Fuzzer detects the bug
violating the corresponding p4q query based on the feedback
(reward) received from the P4 switch. Then, it triggers the
P4Tarantula for localization (shown in the center of Figure
6) where it pinpoints the problematic part of the code (high-
lighted). Afterwards, the Patcher is triggered automatically,
patching the necessary problematic parts of the code, i.e.,
adding header field verification statements (highlighted in
right), after checking if the patch was indeed missing from
the P4 program. Finally, Patcher automatically compiles [37]
and deploys the patched P4 program on the P4 switch, and
triggers P6 to ensure that the patches caused no regressions
and fixed the detected bug.
3.2 Fuzzer: RL-guided Fuzzing
The goal of Fuzzer is to detect the runtime bugs discussed
in §2.2. We improve [20] by augmenting Fuzzer with the
static analysis of a P4 program which makes the Fuzzer aware
of the input structure or accepted header layouts, e.g., IPv4,
IPv6, etc. and thus, it significantly reduces the input search
space. Indeed, techniques to further reduce the input search
space within the accepted headers are discussed in [38], which
can be augmented to static analysis. We guide the mutation-
based white-box fuzzing [12] via RL [21, 22]. The feedback
in the form of rewards is received from the switch based on
the evaluation of actual against expected runtime behavior.
Note, the expected behavior is determined using the static
analysis, the control plane configuration, i.e., forwarding rules
and p4q queries (§3.2.1). p4q queries are conditional queries
(if-then-else) where each query has multiple conditions
and each condition acts as a test case. A violation of a test
case represents a bug detection.
Reinforcement Learning (RL). Reinforcement learning [21,
22] is a machine learning technique that aims at enabling an
Agent to learn how to interact with an environment, based
on a series of reinforcements, i.e., rewards or punishments
received from the target environment, in our case, a switch.
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Figure 8: Fuzzer. Reward System (in yellow) and Agent (in pink).
The Agent observes the switch and chooses an action to be
executed. After the action is executed, the Agent receives
a reward or punishment from the switch. While the goal of
learning is to maximize the rewards, we argue it is equally
crucial to design a machine learning model which is general
enough for any kind of target environment. To detect the bugs
triggered by fuzzing, one can observe the output of the target
switch in response to the input packets. Thus, reinforcement
learning allows developing a Reward System where feedback
in the form of rewards from the switch trains the Agent and
thus, guides the fuzzing process.
In our RL-based model, we define states, actions, and re-
wards as follows:
States: The sequence of bytes forming the packet header.
Actions: The set of mutation actions for each individual
packet header field, e.g., add, modify or delete bytes at a given
position in the packet header. Note, the add and modify ac-
tions either use random bytes or bytes from a pre-generated
dictionary (explained below).
Rewards: The Agent can immediately receive the reward,
after a mutated packet was sent to the target switch and the
results of the execution are evaluated. It is likely to experience
sparse rewards when most of the sent packets do not trigger
any bug. Thus, the reward is defined as 0, if the packet did not
trigger a bug and 1, if the packet successfully triggered a bug.
The input to the Fuzzer is a dictionary (hereafter, referred
to as dict) that comprises information extracted from static
analysis, the control plane configuration, and the queries de-
fined with p4q (§3.2.1). The static analysis is used to derive
the input structure awareness such as accepted header layouts
and available header fields in the P4 program. The control
plane configuration comprises the forwarding table contents
and the platform-dependent configuration. Boundary values
for the header fields may be extracted from the p4q queries,
i.e., when queries explicitly compare packet header fields with
values, e.g., TTL > 0.
Figure 8 depicts the Fuzzer workflow. In step 0 (initializa-
tion), the Reward System receives the dict as an input. Then,
the Agent observes the current state or the current packet
header (see the initialization in §3.2.2). The observed state is
the input for the neural networks of the Agent (§3.2.2), which
outputs the appropriate mutation action. The selected action
is applied for the given packet, and the packet is sent to the
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(ing.hdr.ipv4 & 
ing.hdr.ipv4.chksum != calcChksum() , 
egr.egress_port == False, )
(ing.hdr.ipv4 & ing.hdr.ipv4.ver != 4, 
egr.egress_port == False, )
(ing.hdr.ipv4 & ing.hdr.ipv4.ihl < 5, 
egr.egress_port == False, )
(ing.hdr.ipv4 & 
[ing.hdr.ipv4.len < ing.hdr.ipv4.ihl * 4 |
ing.hdr.ipv4.len < 20], 
egr.egress_port == False, )
(ing.hdr.ipv4 & ing.hdr.ipv4.ttl < 2, 
egr.egress_port == False, )
# IPv4 Unicast
(ing.hdr.ipv4, 
egr.hdr.eth.srcAddr == ing.hdr.eth.dstAddr & 
egr.hdr.eth.dstAddr == table_val() & 
egr.hdr.ipv4.ttl == ing.hdr.ipv4.ttl-1 & 
egr.hdr.ipv4.chksum == calcChksum() &
egr.egress_port == table_val(), )
# IPv4 Clone
(ing.hdr.ipv4, 
egr.hdr.eth.srcAddr == ing.hdr.eth.dstAddr & 
egr.hdr.eth.dstAddr == table_val() &
egr.hdr.ipv4.ttl == ing.hdr.ipv4.ttl-1 & 
egr.hdr.ipv4.chksum == calcChksum() &
egr.egress_port IN {clone_sess()}, )
# IPv4 Multicast
(ing.hdr.ipv4, 
egr.hdr.eth.srcAddr == ing.hdr.eth.dstAddr & 
egr.hdr.eth.dstAddr == table_val() &
egr.hdr.ipv4.ttl == ing.hdr.ipv4.ttl-1 & 
egr.hdr.ipv4.chksum == calcChksum() &
egr.egress_port IN {mcast_grp()}, )
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
Query 1
Query 2
Query 3
Query 4
Query 5
Query 6
Query 7
Query 8
Figure 9: p4q Queries. Queries 1-6 represent platform-independent,
and Query 7-8 represent platform-dependent queries respectively.
P4 switch. After the packet is processed by the switch, the
behavior is evaluated, the reward of 1 is generated when the
p4q query specifying the expected behavior is violated and
returned to the Agent. In particular, the packet which was sent
to the P4 switch is saved together with a final verdict (pass
or fail). A packet’s verdict is considered either passed: if the
generated reward is equal to 0, i.e., actual runtime behavior
matches expected behavior when the p4q query is not violated
or failed: if the generated reward is equal to 1, i.e., actual
runtime behavior does not match expected behavior when
the p4q query is violated. Then, the Agent (§3.2.2) uses the
received reward to improve the action selection in subsequent
executions (exploitation).
3.2.1 p4q: Query Language
Before diving into the details of theAgent training, we explain
the query language, p4q [20], used for specifying the expected
switch behavior. To achieve the goal of an automated runtime
verification system, P6 system must query the actual runtime
behavior of a P4 switch against a specification defining the
expected behavior. To extend the query repertoire of p4q
from [20], we augment it with platform-dependent queries. In
a nutshell, p4q queries are used to compare expected against
actual switch behavior.
p4q queries. In a p4q query, the behavior is expressed using
if-then-else statements in the form of tuples. The program-
mer can specify conditions for packets to fulfill at ingress of
the switch (if), with corresponding conditions to fulfill at
egress (then). In addition, the programmer can describe al-
ternative conditions (else), e.g., if the condition of the then
expr: 
expr & expr   Conjunction
| expr | expr   Disjunction
| expr ^ expr   Exclusive disjunction
| !expr   Negation
| assign
var:
header_field
header_field_value
| int
| table_val()
| isCorrect()
assign: 
var == var   Equality
| var < var   Less than
| var > var   Greater than
| var <= var   Less or Equal
| var >= var   Greater or Equal
| var != var   Not Equal
| var IN {...}   Is element of
| header
int:
int + int     Addition
| int - int     Subtraction
| int * int     Multiplication
| int
Figure 10: p4q Grammar.
branch is not fulfilled at egress. To automate the usage of
P6, an option to execute all the queries of p4q with a single
command is provided (see §4). To define these conditions, the
p4q syntax and grammar are used.
p4q Grammar. Figure 10 depicts the grammar and con-
structs defined in p4q. The p4q grammar allows common
boolean expressions and relational operators as they can
be found in many programming languages like C, Java or
Python, to ease the work for the programmer. The boolean
expressions and relational operators have the same semantics
as common logical operators and expressions. Variables
can either be integers, header fields, header field values,
or the evaluation result of the primitive methods, e.g.,
calcChksum() and table_val(). Each header has a prefix
(ing. or egr.) indicating if it is the packet arriving at ingress or
exiting the switch at egress.
Figure 9 illustrates an example of how the packet process-
ing behavior of an IPv4 layer 3 (L3) switch, written in P4, can
be queried easily using p4q. Query 1 (lines 1-3), defines that
incoming packets with a wrong IPv4 checksum are expected
to be dropped. Similarly, the following four queries (lines
4-13) express the validation of the IPv4 version field, the IPv4
header length, the packet length and the IPv4 time-to-live
(TTL) field for packets at ingress of the switch respectively.
However, there are also conditions for packets at the egress
of the switch. These conditions are described by Query 6
(lines 15-20). Namely, changing source and destination MAC
addresses to the correct values, decrementing the TTL value by
1, recalculating the IPv4 checksum and emitting the packet on
the correct port as instructed by the control plane configura-
tion (forwarding rules). Query 7 (lines 22-27) corresponds to
the platform-dependent part of the switch (PRE) and defines
conditions for packets that are cloned by the switch. Such
packets need to fulfill the same conditions as per Query 6,
but the egress port should correspond to the clone session
configuration of the target switch. Similarly, Query 8 (lines
29-34) expresses the conditions for multicast packets that
need to fulfill the same conditions as per Query 7 but the
egress ports should correspond to the configured multicast
group configuration of the target switch.
Note, queries written in p4q can be extended, reused and
provided in the form of libraries. More importantly, the p4q
queries help in the availability of a library of pre-defined
patches for the corresponding violations. Note, an easily ex-
tensible interface is provided to augment p4q further with
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Algorithm 1: Agent Training
Input: Empty prioritized experience replay memory M, uninitialized online and
target network
Output: Trained online and target network models
1 Initialize online network with random weights
2 Initialize target network with copy of online network parameters
3 for i = 1 to num_episodes do
4 Initialize byte sequence b1
5 Preprocess b1 to get the initial state s1 = preprocess(b1)
6 for step = 1 to max_ep_len do
7 Select action astep randomly with probability ε (exploration) or use
online network to predict astep (exploitation)
8 Execute action astep, observe reward rstep and byte sequence bstep+1
9 Set sstep+1 = preprocess(bstep+1)
10 Save the transition (sstep,astep,rstep,sstep+1, terminal) in M
11 Sample batch of transitions (s j ,a j ,r j ,s j+1) from M
12 y j =
{
r j if terminal
r j + γ∗Q(s j+1,maxa Q(s j+1,a j ;Θ),Θ′) otherwise
13 Perform stochastic gradient descent using categorical cross entropy
loss function
user queries as per the deployment scenario to allow detection
of more bugs.
3.2.2 Agent
The Agent houses the RL algorithm (Algorithm 1), which is
inspired by Double Deep Q Network (Double DQN) [39], an
improved version of Deep Q Networks (DQN) [40].
Double Deep Q Network (DDQN). DDQN algorithm [39]
is a recently-developed algorithm based on Q-learning [22],
hence a model-free reinforcement learning algorithm. Model-
free means, the Agent does not need to learn a model of the
dynamics of an environment and how different actions affect
it. This is beneficial, as it can be difficult to retrieve accurate
models of the environment. At the same time, the goal is to
provide sample efficient learning, i.e. reduce the number of
packets sent to the target switch, makes the DDQN a suitable
choice. The basic concept of the algorithm is to use the current
state (packet header) as an input to a neural network, which
predicts the action the Agent shall select to maximize future
rewards. In addition, Double DQN algorithm splits action
selection in a certain state from the evaluation of that action.
To achieve, it uses two neural networks: (i) the online network
responsible for action selection, and (ii) the target network
evaluating the selected action. This improves the learning
process of the Agent, as overoptimism of the future reward
when selecting a certain action, is reduced and thus, helps to
avoid overfitting.
Prioritized Experience Replay. Experience replay [41] was
introduced to eliminate problems of oscillation or divergence
of parameters, resulting from correlated data. To overcome
this problem, the experiences of the Agent, i.e., a tuple com-
prising the current state, predicted action, reward received,
and resulting state are saved in the memory of Agent. To en-
able learning by experience replay, the neural network model
is updated using random samples from past experiences. To
counter the scenario of sparse rewards, a simple form of pri-
Algorithm 2: P4Tarantula (Localizer)
Input: P4 source code (SC), sent packets (Ps) and corresponding verdicts (V )
Output: S[j] - suspiciousness score for the corresponding line j
// V[p] represents the verdict about packet p (pass or fail)
// SC[j] represents line j of the source code
// Initialization
1 totalFailed = 0, totalPassed = 0
2 foreach p in Ps do
3 if V[p] == pass then
4 totalPassed+= 1
5 else
6 totalFailed+= 1
7 end
8 follow p through SC:
9 foreach executed line j in SC do
10 if V[p] == pass then
11 SC[ j].pass+= 1
12 else
13 SC[ j]. f ail+= 1
14 end
15 S[ j] = SC[ j]. f ail/totalFailedSC[ j].pass/totalPassed+SC[ j]. f ail/totalFailed
16 end
17 end
18 call Patcher
oritized experience replay, inspired by [42], is applied. The
memory is sorted by absolute reward and each experience is
prioritized by a configurable factor and the index.
Agent Training Algorithm. Algorithm 1 presents the train-
ing algorithm of the Agent in the P6 system. For our al-
gorithm, we rely on the use of Multi-Layer Perceptron
(MLP) [43]. In the initialization phase, the weights of on-
line and target neural networks are initialized (Lines 1-2). For
each execution, the current state is reinitialized by randomly
choosing a packet header in byte representation from a pre-
generated set of packet headers. The corresponding bytes are
then converted to a sequence of float representations (Lines
4-5). An ε-greedy policy is applied to determine the action to
be executed (Line 7). Applying an ε-greedy policy means that
during training of the Agent, an action is selected randomly
by the Agent with probability ε to ensure sufficient explo-
ration. As the training progresses, probability ε is decreased
linearly until a lower bound is reached. This helps in reducing
overfitting as well, since the Agent never stops exploring the
effects of other actions on the environment during training.
The determined action will be executed, the result is observed
and saved in the experience memory (Lines 8-10). As a last
step, a sample out of the experience memory is selected to
calculate y j which is used to calculate the categorical cross-
entropy loss and perform the stochastic gradient descent step
to update the network weights (Lines 11-13).
3.3 Localizer: P4Tarantula
P4Tarantula is the Localizer or the bug localization module of
P6. P4Tarantula is based on a dynamic program analysis tech-
nique for generic software, Tarantula [23, 25]. In case a bug
is discovered by Fuzzer, it automatically notifies P4Tarantula.
Note, P4Tarantula will not be notified in case of platform-
dependent bugs, as they are neither localizable nor patchable.
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As an input, P4Tarantula uses the P4 program or source code,
the packets that were sent by Fuzzer as per the p4q query (test
cases) to trigger the bug and the pass or fail verdict corre-
sponding to those sent packets. Recall, a verdict corresponds
to a condition of the p4q query which acts as a test case.
Algorithm 2 presents the localization algorithm used by
P4Tarantula. First, P4Tarantula initializes two counters, mea-
suring the number of passed or failed verdicts corresponding
to the sent packets (Line 1). In the next step, P4Tarantula in-
crements the counters according to the verdicts made for the
given packet (Lines 3-7). Now, the P4 source code needs to be
traversed line-by-line (similar to symbolic execution but with
actual packet header values to avoid all possible header val-
ues), to find the code execution path for the given packet (Line
8). For each line in the P4 source code that is executed for
the given packet, counters for the corresponding verdicts are
incremented (Lines 10-14). For the executed lines of the P4
source code, a suspiciousness score [25] is calculated (Line
15). The suspiciousness score is between 0 and 1 as the same
line/s can be executed for passed and failed verdicts corre-
sponding to packets. This score corresponds to the likelihood
that a line of code is causing a potential bug. The closer it is
to 1, the more likely it is that the corresponding line of code
is problematic. Finally, the P4 source code lines are ordered
as per their suspiciousness score to localize the bug. Then,
Patcher is notified.
More details on code traversal by P4Tarantula. While im-
plementing P4Tarantula, we accurately traverse the P4 pro-
gram execution path for any given packet. To overcome, we
have implemented our code-traversal solution as a part of a
script responsible for calculating the suspiciousness scores
for the lines of the source code of the P4 program. We follow
the execution in the source code of the P4 program from the
“start” state of the parser until the end of the execution, i.e.,
the deparser stage of the P4 packet processing pipeline. By
following the execution of the program as soon as it receives
a given packet containing header values, we can determine
how the different conditions in a P4 program are evaluated for
the packet and follow the correct branch of the P4 program at
different branching points.
3.4 Patcher
Patcher is the novel automated patching module of the P6 sys-
tem. If a bug is localized by P4Tarantula, it notifies Patcher.
The input for Patcher is the P4 source code, the results of
static analysis of the P4 source code, the localization results
of P4Tarantula, and the violated p4q query. Patcher compares
the localized problematic parts of the code with appropri-
ate available patches. Note, Patcher comes with a library of
patches for P4 programs, i.e., those which violate p4q queries.
Nevertheless, it can be easily extended when, previously un-
seen bugs, e.g., bugs in application code logic, are detected.
From the results of the static analysis, Patcher can extract
Algorithm 3: Patcher
Input: P4 source code (SC), static analysis results (Sr), localization results (Lr)
and violated p4q query (q)
Output: A patched version of the source-code (PSC)
// The patcher offers a patch only for those lines where the
suspiciousness score ≥ 0.5
1 Import & process user-defined parser state names, header and header field
names, metadata and metadata field names from Sr required for patches in the
patch-library
2 for lines in Lr do
3 if Suspiciousness score ≥ 0.5 then
4 check corresponding line/s of code pinpointed by P4Tarantula
5 if the patch is missing and violating q then
6 apply the preferred patch
7 else
8 inform the programmer
9 end
10 Goto next line
11 else
12 Goto next line
13 end
14 end
15 Compile & re-deploy the patched P4 program (PSC) and notify Fuzzer for
testing the patches and regressions
the needed parser state names, header names, header field
names, metadata names and metadata field names for the
patches in the current version of the library of patches. In
P4, metadata is used to pass information from one of the
programmable or non-programmable blocks to another.
Note, in most P4 programs (including the publicly available
programs from [28–30]) no variables apart from user-defined
names for parser states or header/metadata fields are present.
Thus, with the gathered knowledge about user-defined names
Patcher can compare through, e.g., regex or string comparison,
if the patch (correct code) is already present in the P4 source
code or if missing, the patch needs to be applied. Note, if the
patches in the patch library require the analysis of custom
variables or stateful components, e.g., registers and meters,
the comparison if the patch is present or not requires further
analysis of the code.
In case no appropriate patch is available, the programmer
is informed by the Patcher. After Patcher finishes the execu-
tion, it calls the P4 compiler (p4c) to re-compile the patched
version of the P4 program and triggers the re-deployment of
the code on the P4 switch. In addition, the Fuzzer is notified
by Patcher to test the patched program again, to confirm the
patches and ensure no regressions were caused by the patches
by testing via the p4q queries and executing regression test-
ing.
A patch has the following properties: (a) preferably, few
lines of code, e.g., missing checks in parser, (b) makes the
P4 program conform to the expected behavior, (c) passes
the sanity testing or checks for basic functionality, and (d)
does not cause regressions breaking existing functionality
elsewhere.
Algorithm 3 shows the Patcher algorithm. First, Patcher
imports the needed header or metadata field names, as well as
parser state names for the currently available patches in the li-
brary of patches. Then, for each line in the localization results,
Patcher checks if the suspiciousness score is greater than the
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defined threshold of 0.51 (Line 2), as it is highly likely that
the corresponding line of code is responsible for triggering
the detected bug. In case the suspiciousness score is above the
defined threshold, Patcher will check the corresponding line
of code. The Patcher, then, checks if the patch is available,
e.g., through string comparison with the appropriate patch to
be applied for the violated p4q query. If the patch is indeed
missing, then the problematic line of code is patched, else
the programmer is informed as the appropriate patch is not
available (Lines 3-8). Once, all the localization results are
processed (Lines 9-12), the patched P4 program is compiled
by triggering the compiler (p4c) to be re-deployed on the P4
switch and the Fuzzer is triggered to re-test the patched code
(Line 14).
When is the Patcher automated? Currently, the library of
patches exists for platform-independent bugs, i.e., those vi-
olating p4q queries 1-6 in Figure 9. If the bug exists in a
deployment-specific application code logic, then the program-
mer can be informed by the Patcher to provide patches. Recall,
for platform-dependent bugs, the P4Tarantula will not be in-
voked and the vendor will be informed accordingly.
4 P6 Prototype
We develop a P6 prototype using Python version 3.6 with
≈ 3,100 lines of code (LOC); Fuzzer with ≈ 2,200 LOC,
P4Tarantula with ≈ 490 LOC and Patcher with ≈ 430 LOC.
Fuzzer is implemented using Keras [44] library with Tensor-
flow [45] backend and Scapy [46] for packet generation and
monitoring. Currently, P6 only supports programs written in
P416 [2] as the P4 compiler (p4c [37]) supports the transla-
tion of programs written in P414 [36] to P416. The Agent was
trained separately, for each condition of each query written in
p4q. The training process as well as the later execution using
the trained Agents, however, can be parallelized. For queries
described in Figure 9, the trained model of the Agent can be
reused for testing different P4 programs that implement IPv4
packet processing.
In addition to the modules described in §3, we implement a
control plane module using P4Runtime [47] and Python. For
the P4 switch, we rely on software switches supporting P416,
namely behavioral model (bmv2) [31] with SimpleSwitch-
Grpc target (Version 1.12.0), and Barefoot Tofino Model [32]
(Version 8.3.0). To simplify and automate the usage of P6, a
default option is provided where all queries of p4q are exe-
cuted by: P6 ‘p4/source_code_location’ -default
5 Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the verification capabilities of P6.
1Threshold is configurable as per deployment scenario.
Bug IDs Bugs Queries (Figure 9)
1 Accepted wrong checksum (PI) Query 1
2 Generated wrong checksum (PI) Query 6 (Line 19)
3 Incorrect IP version (PI) Query 2
4 IP IHL value out of bounds (PI) Query 3
5 IP TotalLen value is too small (PI) Query 4
6 TTL 0 or 1 is accepted (PI) Query 5
7 TTL not decremented (PI) Query 6 (Line 18)
8 Clone not dropped (PD) Query 7 (Line 27)
9 Resubmitted packet not dropped (PD) Query 6 (Line 20)
10 Multicast packet not dropped (PD) Query 8 (Line 34)
Table 1: Bugs (with Bug IDs) detected by the P6 prototype through the
violation of the corresponding p4q queries (in Figure 9). Note, PI and
PD refer to platform-independent and -dependent respectively.
5.1 Baselines
We compare P6 against three baseline fuzzing approaches:
(1) Advanced Agent. The first baseline is an Advanced Agent
only relying on random fuzz action selection, i.e., without
prioritized experience replay. Thus, Advanced Agent can exe-
cute the same mutation actions as P6, but cannot learn which
actions lead to rewards. It represents the intelligent baseline.
(2) IPv4-based fuzzer. The second baseline is an IPv4-based
fuzzer, which is aware of the IPv4 header layout and random-
izes the different available header fields, except IP options
fields and the destination IP as it prevents the packets from
being dropped by the forwarding rules of the P4 switch. The
actual behavior is evaluated using the queries of p4q.
(3) Naïve fuzzer. The third baseline is a simple naïve fuzzer,
which is not aware of any packet header layouts. It generates
and sends Ethernet frames from purely random mutation of
bytes. The actual behavior is evaluated using the p4q queries.
5.2 Bugs
Table 1 provides an overview of existing bug types (with bug
IDs) detected in the publicly available P4 programs from [28–
30] by the P6 prototype. These bugs are detected as they
violate the corresponding p4q queries (from Figure 9). In total,
P6 prototype can detect 10 distinct bugs in the P4 programs.
Out of these 10 bugs, 7 are patchable platform-independent
(bugs 1−7), and 3 are platform-dependent bugs (bug 8−10).
Platform-independent bugs. The two detected bugs with
bug ID 1 and 2, are related to wrong IPv4 checksum compu-
tation and missing checksum validation. P6 is able to detect,
localize and patch these bugs. The four bugs with IDs 3−6
are missing or wrong IPv4 packet header validation. Specifi-
cally, missing validation of IP version (bug 3), IPv4 header
length (bug 4), IPv4 total length (bug 5) and IPv4 time-to-live
(TTL) (bug 6). P6 can detect, localize and patch these bugs.
While the current approaches may be able to detect the bugs,
they still lack localization and patching of the bugs. The last
of the platform-independent bugs is faulty TTL decrement
bug (bug 7). In case, the P4 program accepts packets with
IPv4 TTL 0, the TTL decrement is still executed, causing an
incorrect increment of TTL to 255. Note, these 7 platform-
independent bugs already exist in the publicly available P4
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P416 Applications bmv2 (LOC) Tofino (LOC) % increment
basic.p4 [29] 181 257 41.9
basic_tunnel.p4 [29] 219 302 37.9
advanced_tunnel.p4 [29] 242 316 30.6
mri.p4 [29] 277 372 34.3
netpaxos-acceptor.p4 [30] 270 327 21.1
netpaxos-leader.p4 [30] 259 323 24.7
netpaxos-learner.p4 [30] 288 355 23.2
switch.p4 [28] 8715 -2 -
Table 2: P416 Programs’ LOC in bmv2 and Tofino.
programs of [29, 30]. In switch.p4 program [28], bugs with
IDs 1,2,4 and 5 exist.
Platform-dependent bugs. In addition to the aforementioned
platform-independent bugs, P6 is able to detect three platform-
dependent bugs. The first bug (Bug ID 8) is described in Fig-
ure 2 and occurs when using ingress-to-egress clone action. It
violates Query 7 in Figure 9 leading to incorrect forwarding
of cloned packets when they are supposed to be dropped. The
second bug (Bug ID 9) involves the resubmit operation. Pack-
ets with the resubmit metadata field set which are marked to
be dropped in a later stage, will be incorrectly resubmitted,
i.e., the packet will be processed again, starting at the ingress
parser. Thus, packets that are not expected to be resubmit-
ted will be processed again. In the worst case, this can lead
to packets being resubmitted over and over again or other
unexpected behavior. It violates Query 6 in Figure 9. The
third bug (Bug ID 10) involves the multicast operation. If
a packet is marked to be dropped and later the mcast_grp
metadata field is set, then the multicasted copies of the packet
are incorrectly forwarded and do not get dropped. It violates
Query 8 in Figure 9. Note, we found all platform-dependent
bugs specifically, in basic.p4 program [29] on bmv2 plat-
form [31]. Furthermore, these bugs cannot be detected by
current approaches that are based on static analysis.
5.3 Experiment Strategy
For conducting our experiments and to evaluate P6 prototype,
we ran P6 together with the P4 switch and control plane mod-
ule in a Vagrant [48] environment with VirtualBox [49]. We
emulate the network shown in Figure 13. For each program,
separate Vagrant machines, each with 10 CPU cores and 7.5
GiB RAM, are used. The Vagrant machines ran on a server
running Debian 9 OS (Version 4.9.110), with Intel Xeon CPU
and 256 GiB RAM. Each experiment was executed ten times
on each of the eight P416 programs shown in Table 2 from P4
tutorials [29], NetPaxos [30] and switch.p4 [28] repository.
For each of the ten runs, 9 test-cases were executed, where
each test-case corresponds to one condition of the queries
1−6 illustrated in Figure 9. Note, basic.p4 program has 10
test-cases as it is also tested using query 7 for the platform-
dependent bug. Furthermore, we currently trained the Agent
separately for each test-case and sequentially execute the test
cases. This can, however, be parallelized easily. We observed
2switch.p4 is not publicly available for Tofino.
that for only two conditions of the p4q queries, no bugs were
detected.
5.3.1 Experiment Topology
Figure 13 shows the topology used for the experiments as part
of the P6 system evaluation. In total, five virtual machines are
used. One of the machines is running the P4 switch, which is
connected to all other machines. The controller is connected
to the P4 switch, in order to deploy the P4 program and fill
the forwarding tables. The P6 system is connected to one port
of the switch for sending the packets generated by Fuzzer.
Two virtual machines act as the receiver for these packets.
The feedback of the receivers is used by the P6 system to
evaluate the actual behavior of the P4 switch. In addition, the
machine running P6 is connected to the controller to trigger
re-deployment of the patched P4 program, in case a bug is
detected.
5.4 Metrics
In particular, we ask the following questions:
Q1. How much time does P6 take to detect, localize, and patch
all bugs? (§5.4.1)
Q2. How does P6 perform against the baselines? (§5.4.2)
Q3. How many rewards does P6 generate against the baseline
of an Advanced Agent for Agent training? (§5.4.3)
Q4. How many packets does P6 generate to detect bugs
against the baselines? (§5.4.4)
Q5. What is the accuracy of P6 ? (§5.4.5)
5.4.1 Performance of P6
To evaluate the performance of P6, we execute the detection,
localization, and patching on 8 publicly available P4 programs
from the P4 tutorials [29], NetPaxos [30] and switch.p4 [28]
repository with minimal manual efforts.
Figure 11a and 11d show the median bug detection time
of P6 over ten runs for the different programs using bmv2
SimpleSwitchGrpc and Barefoot Tofino Model, respectively.
Note, switch.p4 program is only available for bmv2 and
was not tested using Tofino. In all runs on bmv2 except for
switch.p4 program, P6 was able to detect all bugs in less
than two seconds. In switch.p4, P6 was able to detect all
bugs in less than ten seconds. The detection time is higher for
switch.p4 as compared to the other tested programs since
more packets get dropped making bug detection more difficult.
On Tofino, the median detection time was slightly higher for
four out of seven programs. The reason for the increased bug
detection time with the NetPaxos programs [30] can be due
to the instrumentation of these programs by us to make them
run on CPU intensive Tofino Model.
Figures 11b and 11e illustrate the median bug localiza-
tion time of P6 for the different programs using bmv2 Sim-
pleSwitchGrpc and Barefoot Tofino Model. Overall, all bugs
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Figure 11: Bug detection, localization and patching times of different P4 programs in bmv2 and Tofino. Each plot represents a median over 10 runs.
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(a) Speedup of median bug detection times: P6 vs
Advanced Agent. Bug IDs (Table 1) in the legend.
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(b) Speedup of median bug detection times: P6 vs
IPv4-based fuzzer. Bug IDs (Table 1) in the legend.
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selection) in the case of bug 4 (Table 1).
Figure 12: P6 vs Baselines. Each plot represents a median over 10 runs.
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Figure 13: Experiment Topology
for 7 of the programs were localized by P6 in just above 0.12
seconds on bmv2 and Tofino. To our surprise, the bug local-
ization time for switch.p4 program running on bmv2 is only
increased by a factor of 4×, even though the program has
about 30× more lines of code compared to the other tested
programs (see Table 2). The median time of patching the code
is shown in Figures 11c and 11f for bmv2 and Tofino respec-
tively. P6 is able to patch the P4 programs with millisecond
scale performance (max. 98 milliseconds).
5.4.2 P6 vs Baselines: Detection Time
We compare P6 against the three baseline approaches in terms
of bug detection time. We observe that the Advanced Agent
baseline, see Figure 12a (with quartiles), was able to detect
all the bugs present in the tested programs, which is due to
the similarity with the P6 Agent. Advanced Agent, however,
cannot learn from the rewards, hence generates more packets
and thus, takes more time to detect the bugs than P6 Agent.
IPv4-based fuzzer was only able to detect 4 out of 10 bugs
in the seven programs from [29, 30]. For switch.p4 pro-
gram [28], IPv4-based fuzzer was able to detect 3 out of 4
bugs which were IPv4-based. In Figure 12b (with quartiles),
the speedup is defined as infinite for the test-cases where
IPv4-based fuzzer could not detect the bug. Accordingly, the
bars representing these test-cases range until the top of the
figure. Note, Naïve fuzzer was not able to detect bugs at all,
even though generating 16k packets.
Figure 12a shows the speedup (Advanced Agent/P6 Agent)
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P416 Applications P6 Advanced Agent IPv4-based Naïve
basic.p4 [29] 13 59 8,035 16,000
basic_tunnel.p4 [29] 11 59 6,044 14,000
advanced_tunnel.p4 [29] 12 57 6,038 14,000
mri.p4 [29] 10 61 6,058 14,000
netpaxos-acceptor.p4 [30] 11 52 6,021 14,000
netpaxos-leader.p4 [30] 9 49 6,024 14,000
netpaxos-learner.p4 [30] 12 44 6,026 14,000
switch.p4 [28] 28 113 2,132 14,000
Table 3: P6 vs Baselines. Median #packets sent per run over 10 runs.
for all bugs detected in the seven tested programs from [29,30].
The results show that P6 Agent can detect bugs up to 10.96×
faster than the Advanced Agent baseline. Only bug 7 was
detected faster by the Advanced Agent in 3 of the 7 P416
applications tested as the Advanced Agent needs less time
for random action selection than P6 Agent for intelligent
action selection, based on its neural networks. In addition,
Advanced Agent can make use of the same mutation actions
and the pre-generated dict, hence when triggering the bug,
the overall execution time will be slightly lower than that of
P6 Agent. In 94% of the test-cases, Advanced Agent required
more time and packets to detect the bugs than the P6 Agent.
For switch.p4 program [28], the results show that P6 Agent
is able to detect bugs up to 30× faster than the Advanced
Agent baseline.
Figure 12b shows the speedup (IPv4-based fuzzer/P6
Agent) for all bugs detected in the seven tested programs
from [29,30]. For the test-cases where IPv4-based fuzzer was
able to detect the bug, we observe that in 89% of the test-cases
P6 Agent is able to detect the bugs faster while sending sig-
nificantly fewer packets. P6 Agent outperforms IPv4-based
fuzzer by up to 8.88× even though IPv4-based fuzzer sends
packets at a higher rate. For switch.p4 program, the results
show that P6 Agent is able to detect bugs up to 30× faster
than IPv4-based fuzzer.
5.4.3 P6 vs Advanced Agent Training
To verify that P6 Agent is able to effectively learn to detect
bugs, we compare P6 Agent against an Advanced Agent, that
only relies on random action selection. This makes Advanced
Agent similar, but not as intelligent as P6 Agent. Advanced
Agent can still execute the same mutation actions but is not
able to reason about which actions lead to maximized rewards.
Figure 12c shows a comparison of the mean cumulative re-
ward (MCR) of the training process of both agents for bug
ID 4 of Table 1. We observe that the P6 Agent is able to out-
perform the baseline by a factor of 3.56× for the mentioned
case. Especially, the prioritized experience replay helps the
P6 Agent to quickly learn about which actions lead to reward,
hence trigger bugs in the program. Since, the P6 Agent is
trained only using experiences which are valuable for the
training.
P6 Agent is trained for each condition of each query de-
scribed by Figure 9 using the same set of hyper-parameters.
More results. Figure 14 shows the training comparison re-
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Figure 14: Training: P6 vs Advanced Agent (random action selection)
in the case of bug ID 2 in Table 1.
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Figure 15: Training: P6 vs Advanced Agent (random action selection)
in the case of bug ID 5 in Table 1.
sults for the bug ID 2 (Generated wrong checksum) in Table 1.
Also, in this case, the P6 Agent is able to outperform the Ad-
vanced Agent baseline by a factor of 2.62×.
The training comparison results for the bug ID 5 (IP
TotalLen Value is too small) can be seen in Figure 15,
showing that P6 Agent is able to outperform Advanced Agent
baseline by a factor of 2.06×.
In the case of the bug ID 6 (TTL 0 or 1 is accepted), P6
Agent is able to outperform Advanced Agent baseline by a
factor of 2.11×, as illustrated by Figure 16.
Figure 17 shows that P6 Agent outperforms Advanced
Agent for the bug ID 7 (TTL not decremented) by a factor
of 2.03×. These results show the clear advantage of P6 Agent
over the Advanced Agent baseline.
Above results show P6 Agent consistently outperforms Ad-
vanced Agent in MCR for other queries. Overall, this shows
the clear advantage of P6 Agent over the baselines and the
ability to detect bugs with fewer packets.
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Figure 16: Training: P6 vs Advanced Agent (random action selection)
in the case of bug ID 6 in Table 1.
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Figure 17: Training: P6 vs Advanced Agent (random action selection)
in the case of bug ID 7 in Table 1.
5.4.4 P6 vs Baselines: Dataplane Overhead
Table 3 illustrates the number of packets sent by P6 and the
baselines. This shows the usefulness of the P6 Agent which
generates less packets by learning about rewards, and gen-
erates packets that trigger bugs. In this case, the Advanced
Agent is almost similar. IPv4-based fuzzer can detect 4 out
of 10 bugs, but generates around 6k packets per run. For each
test-case, naïve fuzzer sends around 2k packets (in total be-
tween 12k and 16k) but it was not able to trigger any bug.
5.4.5 P6 Accuracy
During the experiments, we could not observe any false posi-
tives in bug detection. Note, false positives can occur if the
p4q queries are not correct and complete. In the case of bug
localization by P4Tarantula, false positives are not observed.
We did not observe any false positives in patching by the
Patcher as it only fixes the code if the correct code is missing.
Note, if localization results by P4Tarantula contain false posi-
tives, then Patcher is prone to false positives as it makes the
patching decisions based on the localization results.
Summary. Our results show that P6 due to RL-guided fuzzing
significantly outperforms the baselines across two different
platforms: bmv2 and Tofino in terms of detecting runtime
bugs (including platform-dependent bugs) with minimal data-
plane overhead non-intrusively. We observe that most of the
platform-independent bugs existed in the parser or header part,
otherwise packets with invalid headers get rejected. P6 accu-
rately and swiftly localizes and patches (millisecond scale)
the bugs due to the P4 program structure in an automated
fashion.
6 Related Work
Verification of programmable networks has been in a constant
state of flux. Approaches like [50–52] perform modeling of
the network from the control plane to check the reachabil-
ity, loop freedom, and slice isolation. ATPG [53] generates
test packets based on control plane configuration using [50]
for functional and performance verification in traditional net-
works and SDNs (Software-defined Networks). All of the
aforementioned tools [50–53], however, assume that the con-
trol plane has a consistent or correct view of the data plane
in traditional IP-based networks or SDNs only. P6 does not
assume the correctness of the control plane and observes the
runtime behavior to detect, localize and patch the software
bugs in P4 switches. [54–56] use different machine learning
approaches for finding security vulnerabilities or compiler
specific-bugs which cause crashes, however, they are insuf-
ficient for network-related verification. P6 executes switch
verification to identify the bugs in a P4 switch.
Currently, most of the P4-related verification techniques,
use static analysis of P4 programs using symbolic execu-
tion [4, 6, 7] or Hoare logic [5]. The static analysis is prone to
false positives as it analyzes the P4 program without passing
any real inputs, e.g., packets. Therefore, checksum-related
bugs where computations are required on input packets and
platform-dependent bugs cannot be detected. Such bugs re-
quire P6-like runtime verification. In addition, [5–7] require
a P4 program to be manually annotated by the programmer
which is cumbersome and prone to manual errors whereas P6
is non-intrusive as it does not require to modify P4 program
for bug detection and localization. p4pktgen [8] focuses on
locating errors in the toolchains used to compile and run P4
code, e.g., p4c, and uses symbolic execution to create exem-
plary packets which can execute a selected path in the pro-
gram. However, it cannot detect platform-dependent bugs or
egress pipeline bugs. Such a verification method can comple-
ment our solution. P4NOD [57] statically models the network,
however, it does not check how the actual P4 switches behave
upon receiving the malformed packets e.g., incorrect IPv4
checksum. Cocoon [58] suggests refinement-based program-
ming for network verification. While this approach tries to en-
sure that programs match their specification, it requires a huge
amount of additional and manual user input. For runtime veri-
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Related work in P4 Runtime Verification Detection Localization Patching Detection of PD bugs
Cocoon [58] × X X × ×
Vera [4] × X × × ×
p4v [5] × X × × ×
P4-ASSERT [6, 7] × X × × ×
P4NOD [57] × X × × ×
p4pktgen [8] × X × × ×
P4CONSIST [9] X X × × ×
P4RL [20] X X × × ×
P6 X X X X X
Table 4: Related work in P4 verification. PD corresponds to the
platform-dependent bugs. Note,Xdenotes the capability, and ×
denotes the missing capability.
fication, such a formal method is insufficient. Recently, [59]
propose data-plane primitive for detecting and localizing bugs:
tracking each packet’s execution path through the P4 program
by augmenting P4 programs. However, this remains an in-
progress and intrusive approach as it requires augmenting
P4 code whereas P6 does not change P4 program.In-band
network telemetry (INT) [60, 61] enables to collect telemetry
data from each switch, however, unlike P6, it cannot local-
ize or patch bugs if packets get dropped. Recently, Shukla
et al. proposed P4CONSIST [9], a system that gathers the
control and data plane states independently for comparison
to verify the control-data plane consistency of P4 SDNs by
detecting the path violations for critical flows in P4, however,
without localization or patch support. In [20], a machine learn-
ing guided-fuzzing system is used to only detect platform-
independent bugs in P4 programs. In the context of fuzzing,
two approaches like [10] and [17] are worth-considering. [10]
is insufficient as it uses program coverage feedback to guide
fuzzing without knowing which mutations lead to bugs. [17]
transforms the target program to remove sanity checks for
fuzzing, however, it is intrusive as the target program requires
modification for testing.
Unlike P6, P4-based verification approaches [4–9,20,57,58,
60, 61] are insufficient in localizing and patching the runtime
bugs in P4 programs. Besides, they cannot detect the platform-
dependent bugs. Table 4 illustrates the capabilities of other
P4 verification tools as compared to P6.
7 Discussion
Traditionally, fuzz testing or fuzzing is known to offer a partial
testing solution as it is prone to false negatives. Rice’s theo-
rem [62] states that all the non-trivial, semantic properties of a
program are undecidable. Semantic properties refer to the be-
havior of a target program for all inputs. Therefore, if fuzzing
does not detect any problems, it does not ensure that there
is no problem at all. Statistical techniques like Good-Turing
frequency estimations [63–65] for fuzz testing partially, aid
in inferring the probability that the next generated test input
leads to the discovery of a previously unseen species.
In general, the quality of the input seeds, e.g., the relevance
of mutations to the target and program coverage serve as good
indicators to assess the quality of a fuzzer. However, there
is a tradeoff between speed and precision of fuzz testing as
there is an instrumentation overhead involved in generating
a dictionary of meaningful inputs for effective testing and
significantly reducing the input search space as compared to
random mutations of bits in the inputs.
Machine learning techniques like reinforcement learn-
ing [21, 22] helps to some extent with the training of the
models based on the feedback from the target. However, what
is a good feedback? is debatable. Traditionally, feedback de-
pends on the coverage but it all boils down to the program un-
der test. In addition, machine learning is as good as the input
training data and thus, offers insufficient guarantees as instead
of learning, the model may memorize. A generalized model
applicable to any kind of training data is highly desirable as
it avoids the problems of overfitting and underfitting [66].
Dynamic program analysis technique for fault-localization
like Tarantula [23–25] benefits from utilizing the information
from multiple failed test cases which helps it in leveraging the
richer information base. Therefore, it helps to have at least
one failed test case. In addition, allowing tolerance for passed
test cases that occasionally execute faults is essential for an
effective fault-localization technique.
Software patching facilitates in fixing the software code
errors. The patches, however, may cause regressions which
reflect in the form of abnormal behavior of the software. San-
ity testing and modular code design facilitate in ensuring that
basic functionality is not affected by the patch. However, one
cannot assure that there are no other problems (false nega-
tives) caused by the fix.
We note that leveraging programmability, future pro-
grammable networks will encompass even more possibilities
of faults with a mix of vendor-code, reusable libraries, and
in-house code. As such the general problem of network verifi-
cation will persist and we will have to explore how to extend
the P6 system to traditional IP-based networks.
8 Conclusion
We presented P6, the first system that enables runtime ver-
ification of P4 switches in a non-intrusive fashion. P6 uses
static analysis- and machine learning-guided fuzzing to detect
multiple runtime bugs which are then, localized and patched
on the fly with minimal human effort. Through experiments
on existing P4 application programs, we showed that P6 sig-
nificantly outperforms the baseline bug detection approaches
to detect existing platform-independent and -dependent bugs.
In the case of platform-independent bugs, P6 takes advantage
of the increased programmable blocks to localize them and
repair the P416 programs, if and when a patch is available.
We believe P6 is an important foray into self-driving net-
works [67], which come with stringent requirements on de-
pendability and automation. With P6, developers of P4 pro-
grams and operators of P4-enabled devices can improve the
security of their products. As a part of our future agenda, we
plan to apply P6 on commercial-grade P4 programs and net-
works to report on our experience. We will also release the
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P6 software and library of ready patches that we, respectively,
developed and used in this work.
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